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In this country, scant recognition has been given overtly, aside from
the copyright law, to the legal problems raised by artistic
creativeness.1
Artists in this country play a very important role in capturing the
essence of culture and recording it for future generations. It is often
through art that we are able to see truths, both beautiful and ugly.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, a series of trends in constitutional and
intellectual property have significantly reshaped the impact of tradi-
tional intellectual property laws for the art community. Attribution of
* Director, NKU Chase Law + Informatics Institute and Professor of Law,
Northern Kentucky University Salmon P. Chase College of Law; J.D. Columbia Uni-
versity School of Law 1988. The author would like to thank the members of the Texas
A&M Law Review and congratulate them on their inaugural event. Thanks also to the
symposium participants, including Sydney Beckman, Megan Carpenter, Steven Jamar,
Michael Murray, Lucas S. Osborn, Susan Richey, Sergio Sarmiento, and Peter Yu, for
their engagement and insights on these and other topics.
1. Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists,
Authors and Creators, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554 (1940).
2. Statement of Representative Edward Markey in support of the Visual Artists
Rights Act, H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6916.
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a work to the artist and protection of the integrity of a work from
alternation are historical bedrocks of artistic protections, but those
protections have been diminished for digital artists. The Visual Artists
Rights Act excludes digital works from the definition of works of vis-
ual art, thus excluding these works from rights of attribution and in-
tegrity.3 At the time, rights of attribution and integrity were seen as
quasi-trademark rights, and artists were protected under the Lanham
Act.4 Since then, however, the Supreme Court has extended copy-
right’s preemption over trademark, undermining an artist’s ability to
have non-contractual protections for the artist’s identity and integrity
in a work.5 In addition, a second trend within the digital environment
has created additional tensions for artists whose works include celebri-
ties, athletes, or other members of the public. The Supreme Court has
made the clear determination that video games are entitled to com-
plete First Amendment protection, placing those works in the same
category as film, publishing, and works of art.6 Despite this free
speech protection to the medium, a series of inconsistent decisions
among state and federal courts have made unclear when the use of a
person’s likeness in a video game—or video art instillation—would
constitute a violation of the person’s rights of publicity.7
Moreover, the expansion of FTC guidelines to online materials pro-
hibits the false endorsement of commercial products.8 Because of the
ambiguity in the law of publicity rights, the guidelines may affect the
ability of digital artists to exploit images of celebrities, athletes, and
other individuals. These changes are stressing the very nature of copy-
right law and highlight the need for a uniform state right of publicity
law or a federal statute to preempt the field.
This Article reviews the need for comprehensive reform and recom-
mends certain protections for digital artists to bring them in line with
other artists and authors. The Article proposes that public policies
should emphasize the importance of the free speech, attribution, and
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (2012).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (providing federal unfair competition protec-
tion and protection from false designation of origin of works).
5. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (ex-
pressly rejecting the reliance on false designation of origin for copyrighted works).
6. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
7. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying the Trans-
formative Use Test and finding violation of a right of publicity for a college athlete);
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006) (applying the
Transformative Use Test to find no violation of the right of publicity); Doe v. TCI
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (applying the Predominant Use Test in the
context of comic book publishing to find liability for selling a comic book containing
images of hockey players); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir.
2003) (applying the Rogers Test to Rick Rush’s lithographs of is painting entitled
“The Master of Augusta” to find Tiger Wood’s rights of publicity were not violated by
the artwork).
8. FTC Endorsement Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,124, 53,125 (Oct. 15, 2009)
(Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising).
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integrity rights of artists. Foundationally, the law must drop the differ-
entiation between physical and digital media. Moreover, the public is
better served with an explicit regime that protects the artist from in-
terference with the artist’s human subject, unless the work is used to
sell an unrelated product or service. In other words, the rights of the
artist are protected when it is the work which is sold, licensed, exhib-
ited, or displayed. Only when an artwork was used to sell or advertise
another product or service would the subject of the work have a right
to permit or reject the use.
II. WHY ATTRIBUTION MATTERS—AN ARTIST’S PERSPECTIVE
My name, dear saint, is hateful to myself,
Because it is an enemy to thee.9
In 1917, Marcel Duchamp, under the pseudonym R. Mutt, entered
an artwork entitled “Fountain” into the first exhibition of the Ameri-
can Society of Independent Artists.10 The work and the $5.00 entry
fee were returned.11 Over time, as the artist became known and the
meaning of the work discussed, the importance of the exhibit grew.
The exhibited work was a porcelain urinal, placed upside down. The
meaning variously includes a visual allusion to male-female relation-
ships given the purpose of the urinal and the vaginal shape of the ob-
ject when inverted;12 “an oeuvre of extraordinary visual and
intellectual rigor . . . reflective of other art and culture around him”;13
an attempt to reject aesthetic beauty returning as a value in neo-Dada
artforms;14 or some combination or variation of these themes.
Duchamp’s work, in general, and this work in particular, is recognized
as the forerunner of the intellectual basis for the later Postmodernism
and Avante Garde art movements.15
The meaning attributable to “Fountain” derives part of its power
from the transition from its pseudonymous origins to its role within
9. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, ACT II, SCENE II.
10. William A. Camfield, Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain: Its History and Aesthetics
in the Context of 1917, 65–70, in MARCEL DUCHAMP ARTIST OF THE CENTURY (Ru-
dolf E. Kuenzli & Francis M. Naumann, ed., 2005).
11. Id. at 68.
12. Id. at 83.
13. Id. at 81.
14. Id. at 80.
15. See, e.g., MOIRA ROTH & JONATHAN D KATZ, DIFFERENCE / INDIFFERENCE:
MUSINGS ON POSTMODERNISM, MARCEL DUCHAMP AND JOHN CAGE xiii (1999);
Jeanne S. M. Willette, Beginning Postmodernism: Forming the Theory, ARTHISTORY-
UNSTUFFED.COM, http://www.arthistoryunstuffed.com/tag/marcel-duchamp/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 24, 2013) (“Perhaps due to the impact of Marcel Duchamp, postmodern art
became more conceptual, exposing the hidden heart of Modernism: representation.
The Modernist artist ‘represented’ humanity by ‘representing’ individuality, but the
postmodern artist, thinking of Duchamp began making art that did not ‘represent’ but
was ‘about’ an idea.”).
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the body of work attributed to Duchamp.16 It reflected the interplay
between the identity of the artist and the existence of the work.17 The
work has become famous, well recognized, and entirely outside of
copyright.
Copyright law protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangi-
ble medium of expression.18 “[W]hen someone other than the copy-
right holder seeks to utilize someone else’s protected work in a way
which is protected by the copyright law, that person (or entity) must
obtain permission or be in violation of the copyright law.”19 The law,
however, excludes both utilitarian aspects20 and short phrases and ti-
tles.21 Although displayed upside down, “Fountain” was a utilitarian
item with “R. Mutt” scrawled on its side as its pseudonymous signa-
ture.22 The name on the inverted utilitarian object was likely to be
below the required minimum of creativity necessary for copyright pro-
16. See generally, Camfield, supra note 9, at 80–83.
17. See Peter Jaszi, Toward A Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Au-
thorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 497 (1991) (quoting 1 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN,
LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 145 (2d ed., 1987)) (“The primary justification
for the protection of moral rights is the idea that the work of art is an extension of the
artist’s personality, an expression of his innermost being. To mistreat the work of art
is to mistreat the artist, to invade his area of privacy, to impair his personality.”). See
also Lucas S. Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and the Public: Three-Dimensional Printing
Technology and the Arts, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 811, 824 (2014) (discussing the author-
ship of 3D rendered objects).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
19. Sydney A. Beckman, The Copyright Crusher: How Apple’s iTunes Is a Vehicle
Designed for Copyright Infringement and Apple’s Legal Liability from Its Creation, 1
TEX. A&M L. REV. 901, 907 (2014).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
“Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” include two-dimensional and
three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs,
prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and
technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such works shall include
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical
or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined
in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work
only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
Id. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (permitting copyright protection in non-
utilitarian aspects of functional items).
21. See Copyright Protection Not Available for Names, Titles, or Short Phrases,
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR, at 34, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ34.pdf
(“The Copyright Office cannot register claims to exclusive rights in brief combina-
tions of words such as: . . . Pseudonyms of individuals (including pen or stage
names”)).
22. See Camfield, supra note 9, at 82, 89 (explaining that the pseudonym was likely
derived from the following: “Richard” was French slang for money bags, and abbrevi-
ated to the initial “R.” while “Mutt” was a play off the popular comic Mutt & Jeff and
the manufacturer J. L. Mott Iron Works of Trenton New Jersey).
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tection.23 And of course, it was not Duchamp but the manufacturer, J.
L. Mott, which had rights to the urinal’s design. As with other found
objects (or Objet Trouvé), unless the works were incorporated into a
larger work, copyright protection would be unavailable.
At the same time, a catalog photograph of the “Fountain” would be
protected by copyright, though the protection would not extend to dis-
play of the inverted Mott urinal. As a result, copyright would provide
no legal protection for the work.
Moreover, were a controversy to erupt today over the provenance
of such a work, copyright preemption would preempt trademark law
from protecting Duchamp of claiming any rights to recognize that
Duchamp was the source of the “Fountain” and messages for which it
stands.24 This was not the law at the time the “Fountain” first ap-
peared, and as technology transforms the canvas upon which creative
works are displayed, U.S. laws need to return to a system that recog-
nizes the source of creative works.25 There are schools of criticism sug-
gesting that such importance of the author or artist misinterprets the
work.26 This literary debate, however, does not focus on whether attri-
23. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (“Origi-
nality remains the sine qua non of copyright . . . . Others may copy the underlying
facts from the publication, but not the precise words used to present them.”).
24. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
In sum, reading the phrase “origin of goods” in the Lanham Act in accor-
dance with the [Trademark] Act’s common-law foundations (which were not
designed to protect originality or creativity), and in light of the copyright and
patent laws (which were), we conclude that the phrase refers to the producer
of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any
idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.
Id.
25. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic
Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 2012 (2006) (calling for
expansion of moral rights); see also Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law
and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49, 50–51 (2006) (advocating amendment to
copyright act for broader attribution rights); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim
Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 307 (2004)
(discussing limitation on Dastar ruling).
26. See, e.g., Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT
142, 142 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977):
To give an Author to a text is to impose upon that text a stop clause, to
furnish it with a final signification, to close the writing. This conception per-
fectly suits criticism, which can then take as its major task the discovery of
the Author (or his hypostases: society, history, the psyche, freedom) beneath
the work: once the Author is discovered, the text is “explained”: the critic
has conquered; hence it is scarcely surprising not only that, historically, the
reign of the Author should also have been that of the Critic, but that criti-
cism (even “new criticism”) should be overthrown along with the Author.
Id. See also Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento and Lauren van Haaften-Schick, Cariou v.
Prince: Toward a Theory of Aesthetic-Judicial Judgments, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 941,
951 n.63 (2014) (“Beginning in the mid-to-late 1970s however there emerged an aca-
demic discourse of critical theory and visual culture, and with it a generation of artists
creating works using familiar images from popular culture and the history of art . . .
often to the effect of inserting one’s own name . . . .”); see also Michael Foucault,
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bution should exist, but whether it should be utilized as a tool of liter-
ary criticism.27 Moreover, the worlds of literary and art criticism often
diverge, making any legal doctrinal distinction based on these mores
quite ill placed.28
In addition to attribution providing meaning and context to a work,
attribution also provides an important economic reward for its crea-
tor. In some cases, this reward is directly tied to resale royalties, or
droit de suite rights, due to the artist under state laws.29 Droit de suite
laws emphasize the commonly known injustice that an artist’s works
may sell for a very small amount when created, earning the artist little,
but exploding into exceptionally high-valued cultural icons that earn
gallery owners and collectors millions even as the artists languishes in
poverty.30
Other resale royalty rationales focus on the difference between cop-
yright’s protection of reproduction, distribution, and adaptation
rights, while moral rights such as rights of integrity and resale royalty
rights focus on the unique value of the original object in which the
What is an Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-STRUCTURAL-
IST CRITICISM 141 (J. Harari ed., 1979).
27. See, e.g., WILLIAM IRWIN, THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF THE AUTHOR?
(Greenwood Press, 2002). See also Anton Vidokle, Art Without Artists?, 16 E-FLUX,
May 2010, available at http://worker01.e-flux.com/pdf/article_136.pdf (last visited Nov.
25, 2013) (“If the artist is already expected to question the social, the economic, the
cultural, and so forth, then it goes without saying that when a curator supersedes the
artist’s capacity as a social critic, we abandon the critical function embodied by the
role of the artist and reduce the agency of art.”).
28. See WENDY LEEDS-HURWITZ, SEMIOTICS AND COMMUNICATION: SIGNS,
CODES, CULTURES 36–38 (noting that while art criticism, literary criticism, and behav-
ioral studies, the critic or researcher “interprets what occurs.”). Signifiers or polys-
mers can have multiple meanings and each meaning can be communicated through
multiple symbols, making criticism and behavior studies acts of interpretation, with
inherent subjectivity. Id.
29. See, e.g., California Resale Royalties Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (a) (West
2012) (“Whenever a work of fine art is sold and the seller resides in California or the
sale takes place in California, the seller or the seller’s agent shall pay to the artist of
such work of fine art or to such artist’s agent 5 percent of the amount of such sale.”).
At least one court has suggested the California version of the law violates the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause and is unconstitutional as presently written. See Estate of
Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
30. See, e.g., Toni Mione, Resale Royalties for Visual Artists: The United States
Taking Cues from Europe, 21 CARDOZO J. INTL. & COMP. L. 461, 501 (2013) (discuss-
ing Robert Rauschenberg’s Thaw, which he sold for $900 and confronted the pur-
chaser, Ethel Scull when she sold it at auction for $85,000); Katreina Eden, Fine
Artists’ Resale Royalty Right Should Be Enacted in the United States, 18 N.Y. INT’L L.
REV. 121, 127 (2005) (discussing Thaw incident as leading to California Resale Royal-
ties Act); Michael B. Reddy, The Droit De Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should
Have the Right to A Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 509 (1995) (quoting Raus-
chenberg as stating “I’ve been working my ass off just for you to make that profit!”)
(with original quote attributed to Roger Ricklefs, Artists Decide They Should Share
Profits on Resale of Paintings, WALL ST. J. , Feb. 11, 1974, at 1; Robert Hughes, A
Modest Proposal: Royalties for Artists, TIME , Mar. 11, 1974, at 66).
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copyright vests.31 Rights of attribution are distinct from resale royal-
ties,32 but false attribution could readily undermine the ability of an
artist to claim her resale royalties.
Second, the attribution has an economic value related to, but not
physically tied to, the work: “The position of an author is somewhat
akin to that of an actor. The fact that he is permitted to have his work
published under his name, or to perform before the public, necessarily
affects his reputation and standing, and thus impairs or increases his
future earning capacity.”33
This can be seen in other artistic fields. Theatrical directors, actors,
and other artists believe that credit or attribution is central to their
continued professional success:34
Since actors’ fees for pictures, and indeed, their ability to get any
work at all, is often based on the drawing power their name may be
expected to have at the box office, being accurately credited for
films in which they have played would seem to be of critical impor-
tance in enabling actors to sell their “services,” i.e., their
performances.35
The value of attribution or credit may be difficult to quantify, but it
influences the overall value of an artist’s body of work, having a multi-
31. See Channah Farber, Advancing the Arts Community in New Mexico Through
Moral Rights and Droit de Suite: The International Impetus and Implications of Pre-
emption Analysis, 36 N.M. L. REV. 713, 746 (2006) (“Copyright law mainly protects
creations capable of being reproduced or “copied” rather than individual objects. A
work of art is fundamentally different from the other subject matter of copyright be-
cause its ultimate value lies in its unique quality as a one-of-a-kind original, not in its
potential for mass reproduction or performance.”); Carole M. Vickers, The Applica-
bility of the Droit de Suite in the United States, 3 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 433,
434–35 (1980) (“Artists’ rights encompass two other important groups of rights—the
droit morale or the moral right and the droit de suite or the proceeds right.”).
32. See, e.g., N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. L. § 14.03 (2012):
2. (a) . . . [T]he artist shall retain at all times the right to claim authorship, or,
for just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of such work. The right to
claim authorship shall include the right of the artist to have his or her name
appear on or in connection with such work as the artist. The right to disclaim
authorship shall include the right of the artist to prevent his or her name
from appearing on or in connection with such work as the artist. Just and
valid reason for disclaiming authorship shall include that the work has been
altered, defaced, mutilated or modified other than by the artist, without the
artist’s consent, and damage to the artist’s reputation is reasonably likely to
result or has resulted therefrom.
(b) The rights created by this subdivision shall exist in addition to any
other rights and duties which may now or in the future be applicable.
33. Clemens v. Press Pub. Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206, 208 (App. Term. 1910) (Seabury, J.,
concurring).
34. See Jeannette Gunderson, An Unaccountable Familiarity: A Dual Solution to
the Problem of Theft in Theatrical Productions, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 667, 696
(2008).
35. See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981).
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plying effect over time.36 To illustrate this point, the Producers Guild
of America has recently negotiated for a “P.G.A.” designation for
those motion picture producers who are guild members and are re-
sponsible for undertaking the tasks of producing the motion picture.37
Guild members were concerned about the availability of producer
credit being made available to mere investors in film production as
devaluing the credit earned.38 The time, effort, and investment needed
to create this new Guild designation provides a clear illustration of the
importance to creators within an industry, and that value should be
recognized by law.39
Attribution and protection from unfair trade practices have their
philosophical roots in Immanuel Kant.40 He stipulated that
“[w]hoever transacts another’s business in his name and yet against
his will, is obliged to give up to him . . . all the profits that may arise
therefrom, and to repair all the loss, either one or the other.”41 Kant
asserts that “[i]n a book as a writing the author speaks to his reader.”42
Kant focuses on the stripping of the author’s voice, from the author,
and the misattribution such theft creates. The sale of artworks would
not be limited because the physical copies could be bought and sold.
The artist has this right.43 Kant also distinguishes between the artist
who can sell to the public and the author who could, at that time, sell
only through the editor and thus risk a loss of control over the work,
requiring greater legal protections for the author outside of contract.44
Kant was not alone in believing authors required protection from
contracts, and so attribution nearly made it into the common law of
36. Gunderson, supra note 33, at 607 (“While receiving credit for one’s work is
often more a matter of recognition than an issue about compensation, one of the main
reasons that receiving that credit is so critical is because of the importance of one’s
professional reputation in a performance-based industry such as theatre.”).
37. See PGA Putting its “Mark” on New Releases, ABOVE & BELOW LINE (May
30, 2013), http://aboveandbelow.media-services.com/2013/05/30/pga-putting-its-mark-
on-new-releases/ (“Producers Guild of America’s ‘Producers Mark’ for inclusion in all
its film credits, the PGA is closing in on organizing all the major studio distributors
after just two and a half years of campaigning.”).
38. Id.
39. See Clemens v. Press Pub. Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206, 208 (N.Y. App. Term. 1910)
(Seabury, J., concurring).
40. See Immanuel Kant, Of the Injustice of Counterfeiting Books, in 1 ESSAYS AND
TREATISES ON MORAL, POLITICAL, AND VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 225,
228–29 (W. Richardson trans. 1798).
41. Compare id. at 228, with 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2013) (“The copyright owner is
entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the in-
fringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement
and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.”).
42. Kant, supra note 39, at 229 (emphasis in original).
43. Id. at 236–37 (“A drawing, which any one has delineated, or got engraved by
another, or executed in stone, in metal, or in stucco, may be copied, and the copies
publicly sold; as every thing, that one can perform with his thing in his own name,
requires not the consent of another.”) (emphasis in original).
44. Id. at 236–40.
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the United States.45 “Historically, moral rights served as a powerful
legal device for authors to protect their “children” against what
Anthony Trollope called “the book-selling leviathans.”46
In Clemens v. Press Publishing Co.,47 William Clemens, a journalist,
sold a newspaper story to the Press Publishing Company for the im-
pressive amount of two hundred dollars. After revising the news story,
the journalist learned he would not receive the byline for the article,
and objected to publication without the byline. The facts imply the
article was never published, though galley proofs of the edition were
provided to Clemens. Clemens sued for his payment. In a plurality
opinion, the paper was obligated to pay the two hundred dollars.48
The concurring opinion held quite clearly that rights of attribution
were worthy of judicial attention: “Even the matter of fact attitude of
the law does not require us to consider the sale of the rights to a liter-
ary production in the same way that we would consider the sale of a
barrel of pork.”49 The concurrence of Judge Seabury continued to
highlight the need for recognizing the economic reality of the attribu-
tion rights at stake in the contract:
If the intent of the parties was that the defendant should purchase
the rights to the literary property and publish it, the author is enti-
tled, not only to be paid for his work, but [also] to have it published
in the manner in which he wrote it. The purchaser cannot garble it,
or put it out under another name than the author’s; nor can he omit
altogether the name of the author, unless his contract with the latter
permits him so to do.50
This 1910 New York decision highlighted the understanding that au-
thors, artists, and actors have in their name and in the integrity of
their works. Had the judges joined together in the opinion, the New
York law on the subject would have become much more protective
than that which ultimately occurred.
III. WHY ATTRIBUTION MATTERS—THE
CONSUMER’S PERSPECTIVE
In addition to the impact attribution can have on the artist’s mes-
sage and the economic return to the artist, there is also a concern for
the public regarding the legitimacy of the source of a work, whether
the work is a painting, film, or other communicative project. In many
45. See Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 873, 880 (2014).
46. Id. at 886 (quoting ANTHONY TROLLOPE, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 308 (Michael
Sadleir & Frederick Page eds., 1980)).
Clemens v. Press Pub. Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206, 207 (App. Term. 1910).
47. Id.
48. The three-judge panel had three opinions with both Judge Gavegan and Sea-
bury reversing the lower court decision. Judge Lehman dissented. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 208.
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ways, this concern parallels unfair competition law or trademark
law.51
Despite the Clemens v. Press Publishing Co. recognition of attribu-
tion being only a concurrence, courts continued to find for authors,
artists, and actors on a variety of analogous grounds. For example, the
law of unfair competition has long been part of the history of the per-
forming arts. Charlie Chaplin’s success with his Little Tramp character
led to many imitations and a mixed history of litigation.52 Although
Chaplin was a performer rather than the author of the short, The
Champion, he successfully sued the Crystal Palace Theatre over its
use.53 Chaplin was able to stop the advertising of an undersea water
movie into which scenes from The Champion were interspersed.54 It
was only a partial victory; Chaplin was unable to enjoin the showing of
the work itself.55
Chaplin was more successful in defending his Little Tramp character
against Charles Amador to stop a direct imitation.56 Although making
his own films, Amador closely mimicked both the Chaplin character
and the plot of Chaplin’s films. The court of appeals addressed the
manner of Amador’s copying as a form of deception and unfair
competition.57
Plaintiff is not seeking to prevent the appellant, Charles Amador,
from appearing in motion pictures, but only seeks to prevent him
from imitating the plaintiff in such a way as to deceive the public
and work a fraud upon the public and plaintiff. The case of plaintiff
does not depend on his right to the exclusive use of the rôle, garb,
and mannerisms, etc.; it is based upon fraud and deception. The
right of action in such a case arises from the fraudulent purpose and
conduct of appellant and injury caused to the plaintiff thereby, and
the deception to the public, and it exists independently of the law
regulating trade–marks, or of the ownership of such trade–marks or
trade–names by plaintiff. It is plaintiff’s right to be protected against
those who would injure him by fraudulent means—that is, by coun-
terfeiting his role—or, in other words, plaintiff has the right to be
protected against “unfair competition in business.”58
51. See Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonym-
ity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2005) (“Thinking of an
authornym as something akin to an author’s trademark does not require a complete
reinvention of trademark law. Quite the opposite: Just as trademark law is primarily
concerned with consumer confusion but is otherwise agnostic as to the producer’s
choice of mark, trademark law should also be primarily concerned with reader confu-
sion but should care little what authornym the writer chooses.”).
52. See Peter Decherney, Gag Orders, Comedy Chaplin, and Copyright, in MOD-
ERNISM AND COPYRIGHT 149–50 (Paul K. Saint-Amoured., 2010).
53. Id. at 148–49.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928).
57. Id. at 545.
58. Id. at 546.
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The distaste evidenced by the court in Chaplin v. Amador highlights
an uneasy but readily recognized approach to business that while
healthy competition is expected, norms of behavior are essential to
smoothly operating industry. It might be too much to suggest the pub-
lic is fully deceived so much as annoyed at the attempt at deceit. In the
earlier controversy involving the Crystal Palace, for example, “the
Crystal Palace’s attendance dropped by half when it attempted to pass
off a Chaplin imitation as original. . . . [D]evoted fans were nonethe-
less willing to watch imitators’ work in between the star’s sporadic
releases.”59 The public does not like being deceived.
Despite the legal success achieved by Charlie Chaplin and William
Clemens, other plaintiffs did not fare as well. In Gardella v. Log Cabin
Products Co., actress Tess Gardella brought an action against the
makers of Aunt Jemima Pancake Mix over the use of the pseudonym
“Aunt Jemima” when used in musical theatre.60 The Italian-American
Gardella was a well-recognized vaudeville performer who originated
the role of Queenie in the original production of Show Boat in 1929
and reprised her role in the 1932 revival.61 She regularly appeared as
Aunt Jemima, using the non de plum as her stage name.62 Quaker
Oats first registered the Aunt Jemima trademark in 1890 for its pan-
cake flour.63 In 1935, Quaker Oats and Log Cabin teamed up for a
radio advertising campaign in which the character was brought to life
on the radio.64
The Second Circuit recognized Gardella’s right to perform under
the name, because “in her many stage performances since 1920 she
has used that name; sometimes as ‘The Famous Pancake Lady, Aunt
59. Decherney, supra note 51, at 149 (citing TERRY RAMSAYE, A MILLION AND
ONE NIGHTS: A HISTORY OF THE MOTION PICTURE THROUGH 1925, at 732 (New
York: Simon and Schuster 1926)).
60. Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937).
61. FRANK CULLEN, FLORENCE HACKMAN & DONALD MCNEILLY, VAUDEVILLE,
OLD AND NEW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VARIETY PERFORMERS IN AMERICA 430 (Tay-
lor & Francis 2006) (Gardella was the only cast member of the 1932 Showboat revival
to wear blackface and became “[o]ne of the last female [vaudeville] performers to
wear blackface.”).
62. The controversy of the 1920s and litigation ending in 1935 did not address the
racial implications of Gardella’s portrayal of an African-American stereotype. For an
in depth analysis of this topic, see generally SUSAN GUBAR RACECHANGES: WHITE
SKIN, BLACK FACE IN AMERICAN CULTURE (Oxford Univ. Press 1997). As to Gar-
della’s portrayal of Aunt Jemima, see DORIS WITT, BLACK HUNGER: SOUL FOOD
AND AMERICA 34 (U. of Minn. Press 1999) (acknowledging that modern scholars
view Gardella a white performer in blackface, but noting that “Gardella’s success was
owing not to her perceived ‘whiteness’ but instead to her ethnic position between
white and black”).
63. Gardella, 89 F.2d at 893.
64. Id. (“Log Cabin Syrup was a product of the Log Cabin Products, Inc., a subsid-
iary of the General Foods, Inc., and the Aunt Jemima Pancake Flour was a product of
the Quaker Oats Company. Some 3,000,000 small packages of Aunt Jemima’s Pan-
cake Flour were distributed free through grocery stores as a part of the scheme of
advertising.”).
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Jemima, and her Syncopated Bakers.’ She appeared in the production
‘Show Boat’ as Aunt Jemima and also on a radio program for ‘Jad
Salts.’ She sang for phonograph records.”65 As such, the Second Cir-
cuit protected her right to use her name and likeness under New
York’s publicity rights statute.66
Despite Gardella’s ownership of the stage name in Aunt Jemima,
the predecessor trademark rights in the name by Quaker Oats took
precedence. New York publicity law “protects against the unautho-
rized use of a name for the purpose of advertising. But the Quaker
Oats Company needed no authority from the appellee to use the
name ‘Aunt Jemima.’”67
The court then discussed the unfair competition claims, separating
them into claims for “passing off” and for defamation to professional
reputation.68 Under both theories, the court suggested a cause of ac-
tion could exist. “Appellants would have no right to trade upon her
reputation or to pass off an imitation of her singing or form of en-
tertainment which either caused deception, or was likely to do so.”69
Nonetheless, no such damages to earning power or other evidence of
actual damage to reputation could be established, so only nominal
damages were appropriate. With regard to Gardella’s professional
reputation, the limit of Quaker Oats’ duty was to assure that the pub-
lic was not misled into believing an inferior performance was
presented in the name of Gardella’s Aunt Jemima.70 Since both
Quaker Oats and Gardella had rights to the Aunt Jemima name, Gar-
della’s rights “could be impinged upon only in the event that the ficti-
tious Aunt Jemima was so used as to confuse her with [Gardella] as
the theatrical Aunt Jemima. To prevent this, identification of the ficti-
tious character was alone necessary.”71 Gardella may have retained
rights to her use of the name, but they meant little to stop Quaker
Oats’ use of the name in radio and theatrical productions.
The decision continues to suggest that unfair competition is a viable
cause of action to protect a performer’s identity so as to avoid passing
off an inferior artist’s work as the author. In heightening the standard
65. Id. at 894.
66. See id. (“Section 50 makes it a misdemeanor to use the name, portrait, or pic-
ture of any living person for advertising purposes without consent. And section 51
gives to any person whose name, portrait, or picture is so used a right to civil reme-
dies, through injunction and damages. The appellee, having adopted the name ‘Aunt
Jemima’ for use in her professional career, had acquired certain rights.”).
67. Id.
68. Id. (“In reality this cause of action divides itself into two theories. One is that
the appellee was imitated and that the imitation resulted in deception; the usual form
of ‘passing off.’ The second is that the imitation was inferior so that the appellee’s
professional reputation was impaired. This contains a claim of defamation.”).
69. Id. at 895 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 897.
71. Id.
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for economic proof of damages, however, the decision places the
cause of action out of reach for most plaintiffs.
Ten years later, another well-known case further eroded protections
for lack of attribution and unfair passing off. In Vargas v. Esquire,
Inc.,72 famous pin-up artist Alberto Vargas sued Esquire magazine for
using illustrations he provided to the magazine without the attribution
of “Varga” or his signature on the illustrations.73 Although the con-
tract had been cancelled, Esquire retained rights to publish those illus-
tration that had already been delivered. The magazine replaced “The
Varga Girl” title for the works with “The Esquire Girl.”74 The Seventh
Circuit rejected an interpretation of the contract under which the
transfer of ownership in the name “ ‘Varga,’ ‘Varga Girl,’ ‘Varga,
Esq.,’ and any and all other names, designs or material used in con-
nection therewith, shall forever belong exclusively to Esquire”75 and
that there also was a duty to use one of those names in association
with the work. The court understood that no such duty was created.
More specifically, the court rejected the concept of rights of attribu-
tion and moral rights:
Plaintiff advances another theory[,] which needs little discussion. It
is predicated upon the contention that there is a distinction between
the economic rights of an author capable of assignment and what
are called “moral rights” of the author, said to be those necessary
for the protection of his honor and integrity . . . . [W]e are not dis-
posed to make any new law in this respect.76
The decision disposed of moral rights as alien to U.S. common law.
It went on to dismiss claims of unfair competition for sale of the illus-
trations without their customary signatures and under a different title
as factually not relevant. Regarding use of “The Esquire Girl,” as the
title, the court explained, “We think the public would readily recog-
nize the word ‘Esquire’ referred to such magazine and not to the
name of an artist.”77
Under these decisions, rights of attribution were increasingly diffi-
cult to defend. Nonetheless, there continued to be some significant
decisions that recognized the economic importance of attribution
rights. In Smith v. Montoro,78 the court protected the right to billing
under the doctrine of reverse passing off: “Reverse passing off is ac-
complished ‘expressly’ when the wrongdoer removes the name or
72. Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
73. Id. at 524.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 525.
76. Id. at 526.
77. Id. at 527.
78. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981).
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trademark on another party’s product and sells that product under a
name chosen by the wrongdoer.”79
Removing the identification of the source of goods results in im-
plied passing off.80 The plaintiff, Paul Smith, was able to protect his
right to receive the credit he earned under federal trademark law as
well as the related, ancillary state law and breach of contract claims.
The court noted that performers’ names can sometimes be registered
as service marks and that Lanham Act unfair competition protection
does not require registration, so the claim is not barred.81
Recognizing the economic value to the actors, the court found the
substitution of another actor’s name in the credits sufficient to state a
claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.82 This all changed with
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.83
In Dastar, the Supreme Court was asked to address the conflict be-
tween an author’s rights to attribution as protected by copyright and
those rights as protected by trademark law. The work in question was
a television series, which had fallen into the public domain, thus losing
all copyright protection. As such, the public domain work was availa-
ble for use in any manner, and the Court correctly stated that trade-
mark law could not be extended to provide protection for works on
which copyright had lapsed.84 “The right to copy, and to copy without
attribution, once a copyright has expired . . . passes to the public.”85
The right to make full use of the public domain materials included
not just the right to copy and create derivative works but also the right
to use the material without regard to any trademark claims for obliga-
tions to provide attribution.86 “[O]nce the patent or copyright monop-
oly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and
without attribution.”87
The Dastar opinion, however, spanned well beyond the question
before the Court. Ignoring the entire category of service marks, the
court placed a narrow definition on origin of goods to include source
of manufacture or retail only. It rejected the services nature of per-




82. Id. at 607 (describing the performer, as “originator of the misidentified prod-
uct is involuntarily deprived of the advertising value of its name and of the goodwill
that otherwise would stem from public knowledge of the true source of the satisfac-
tory product.”).
83. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003).
84. Id.
85. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
86. Id. at 33–34.
87. Id. (“In construing the Lanham Act, we have been ‘careful to caution against
misuse or over-extension’ of trademark and related protections into areas tradition-
ally occupied by patent or copyright.”).
2014] COMMERCIALIZING THE DIGITAL CANVAS 851
the Lanham Act is incapable of connoting the person or entity that
originated the ideas that ‘goods’ embody or contain.”88
By moving past a discussion of public domain materials and into the
broader decision affecting all attribution rights, the Court has over-
turned Smith v. Montoro—a decision it cited favorably in its opin-
ion.89 The failure to recognize the difference between service marks
and trademarks, the failure to distinguish public domain works from
works under copyright protection, and the failure to recognize legiti-
mate state publicity rights and similar causes of action not preempted
by copyright result in further distortion under Dastar.90
Compare Dastar with Shaw v. Lindheim.91 Unlike the Supreme
Court in Dastar, which made a categorical rejection of trademark ap-
plicability, the Ninth Circuit in Shaw limited reverse passing off to
those instances where the defendant sells the plaintiff’s product—es-
sentially unchanged—under a false name.92 Where the threshold
question is whether copying even exists, the new work cannot be said
to be an unchanged version of the plaintiff’s work, so copyright, rather
than trademark, is the appropriate tool to balance the interests of the
parties. Both copyright and trademark involve a balancing of parties’
interests, so it is appropriate that there are instances when only one of
the balancing questions should be addressed. It does not follow, how-
ever, that there are not instances where both questions must be
addressed.
There was no need to reach beyond public domain works to reach
the rights of an author to claim she was the “origin of the goods”
embodied in communicative works protected by copyright. Nonethe-
less, decisions following Dastar have not focused on the facts of the
decision but rather the sweeping rhetoric, which suggests trademark
rights are unavailable to authors.93 Decisions following Dastar have
embraced its broad, sweeping effect.94
88. Id. at 32–33 (“The concept might be stretched (as it was under the original
version of § 43(a)) to include not only the actual producer, but also the trademark
owner who commissioned or assumed responsibility for (“stood behind”) production
of the physical product.”).
89. Id. at 30.
90. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright
and Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 307 (2004).
91. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.1990).
92. Id. at 1364 (“[Montoro v.] Smith limited reverse passing off to two situations:
‘Reverse passing off is accomplished “expressly” when the wrongdoer removes the
name or trademark on another party’s product and sells that product under a name
chosen by the wrongdoer.’”) (emphasis in original).
93. E.g., Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s holding did not depend on whether the works were
copyrighted or not. . . . Rather . . . the Court noted that protection for communicative
products was available through copyright claims.”).
94. See e.g., Romero v. Buhimschi, 396 Fed. App’x 224, 233 (6th Cir. 2010) (un-
published) (“Assuming that a portion of Romero’s pleadings could fall under
§ 43(a)(1)(B)’s advertising prong, the misconduct alleged in the pleadings would have
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Fortunately, not all courts have applied Dastar to artists’ trade-
marks. In Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., the district court applied tradi-
tional trademark law for a living artist who objected to a gallery’s
creation of online thumbnails of the artist’s works for promotion:95
The evidence demonstrates the LEE TETER mark is associated
with Teter’s works of fine art, which depict scenes of American
frontier life, and has acquired secondary meaning by being distinct
in their subject matter, style and quality. The works are distributed
nationally, are sought-after by established clients, and have ac-
quired a place in the fine art market.96
While Lee Teter received little protection for his trademark, at least
the district court understood that the mark was important to the artist
and the public.97 Ultimately, a cause of action survived the motion for
summary judgment as to whether the defendant’s “use of Teter’s mark
may create confusion as to the source and affiliation Teter’s works and
the [defendant] Gallery . . . .”98 Unlike Dastar, the Teter court under-
stood that a mark may be used to indicate more than one type of
affiliation in the eyes of the public, and some of those affiliations
could generate a likelihood of confusion or other unfair competition.
Despite hope that decisions like Teter suggest courts are beginning
to move past Dastar’s formalism, Dastar creates a fundamental prob-
lem for the United States’ adherence to its treaty obligations under
article 6bis of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (Berne Convention).99 Under the treaty obligations of
the Berne Convention, U.S. law must afford minimum protections to
authors’ rights of attribution and integrity.100 Relying on treaty lan-
guage that allows “redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this
to relate to the ‘nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin’ of the manu-
script.”); see also Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th
Cir. 2008); William, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1185; LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 4
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP., TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 22:7 (4th ed., 1990)
(“The doctrine of reverse passing off is unlikely ever again to provide the creators of
intellectual property with a right of attribution under either federal or state law.”).
95. Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Mo. 2010).
96. Id. at 1155 (“Teter has set forth sufficient evidence for the Court to conclude
LEE TETER is a sufficiently distinct descriptive mark that has acquired a secondary
meaning, and is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act.”).
97. Id. at 1156 (“GOI’s use of the mark was nominative in that it merely identified
the Teter works, thus, indicating GOI did not possess an intent to confuse the public.
Importantly, Teter produced no evidence of actual confusion by the consuming
public.”).
98. Id.
99. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis,
July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne].
100. Id. (“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the trans-
fer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other deroga-
tory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.”).
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Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country where pro-
tection is claimed,”101 the United States relied on a mosaic of common
law and trademark law protections to provide the equivalent of moral
rights protection sufficient to comply with the treaty.102
The mosaic of state and federal laws was essential to United States
ascension into the Berne Convention because Congress took few steps
to amend U.S. law. “Rather, the approach used in all sections of the
bill, including the findings and declarations, is the same: to modify
American law minimally to place it in compliance with the provisions
of the Berne Convention while respecting the constitutional provi-
sions that apply to all such legislative endeavors.”103
As Professor Graeme Dinwoodie put it, “the United States could
adhere to the Berne Convention and (almost without blushing) claim
compliance with the obligation in Article 6bis of Berne . . . based upon
a patchwork of state and federal laws.”104 The House Report identi-
fied sections of the Copyright Act, “section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
relating to false designations of origin and false descriptions,” as well
as “[s]tate and local laws including those relating to publicity, contrac-
tual violations, fraud and misrepresentation, unfair competition, defa-
mation, and invasion of privacy,” as part of the sufficient array of legal
protections to comply with article 6bis without new, positive law.105
The unanimous Dastar decision undermines much of the analysis
underlying these congressional assertions. By explicitly preempting
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court eliminated the
most significant federal protection outside of the Copyright Act.106
Moreover, the preemption of federal unfair competition law may also
erode state unfair competition law. Dastar’s statutory interpretation
seems fundamentally at odds with the House Report’s understanding
of the interplay between copyright and trademark law.
101. Id.
102. See Graeme W. Austin, The Berne Convention As a Canon of Construction:
Moral Rights After Dastar, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 111, 116–17 (2005) (“The
United States declined to enact a new moral rights statute. Instead, adopting a “mini-
malist” approach to the need for implementing legislation, the House Committee on
the Judiciary . . . emphasized that existing state and federal laws already afforded
authors equivalent protections.”) (citations omitted).
103. H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, at 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1037
(“Ideal solutions to issues take much congressional time, require careful examination
of often conflicting interest, and generally lead to the legislative processing of a bill
designed to solve a carefully defined question. That methodology is not used for the
Act.”).
104. Graeme Dinwoodie, Foreign and International Influences on National Copy-
right Policy: A Surprisingly Rich Picture 161, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT
LAW, Vol. 6 (2007).
105. H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, at 34–35 (1988).
106. See id.
854 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1
IV. PROTECTING THE PUBLIC—THE FTC TAKES ON
CONSUMER PROTECTION
The Dastar understanding of “origin” for goods and services also
seems oddly out of place with changes to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion guidelines for promotion of goods and services.107 Concerned
about the potential for the public to be unaware of the funded promo-
tional efforts of content providers such as blog authors and advertis-
ers, the FTC updated the Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (FTC Endorsement
Guidelines) in 2009.108 The 2009 FTC Endorsement Guidelines inter-
pret section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).109 As
such, the FTC Endorsement Guidelines offer “guidance [for] the pub-
lic in conducting its affairs in conformity with legal requirements . . .
[regarding] the use of endorsements and testimonials in
advertising.”110
The FTC Endorsement Guidelines require “the honest opinions,
findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser.”111 They prohibit false
commercial speech by declaring that “an endorsement may not con-
vey any express or implied representation that would be deceptive if
made directly by the advertiser.”112 Presumably the false identifica-
tion of an author or artist of a work offered for sale would constitute
just such a false, deceptive representation. The FTC made the scope of
prohibition quite broad, reaching “any product, service, company or
industry.”113
Undoubtedly, the sale of forged artwork114 or artwork that is falsely
numbered constitutes deceptive trade practices.115 The FTC brought a
series of high-profile cases against unauthorized art republications be-
tween 1991 and 1995, culminating in a series of enforcement actions.
“Operation Bogart—for bogus art—was a government probe that un-
107. See Jon M. Garon, Beyond the First Amendment: Shaping the Contours of
Commercial Speech in Video Games, Virtual Worlds, and Social Media, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 607 (2012).
108. FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Adver-
tising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,124, 53,125 (Oct. 15, 2009) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 255).
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
110. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(a) (2012).
111. Id. § 255.1(a).
112. Id.
113.  Id. § 255.0(d).
114. F.T.C. v. Renaissance Fine Arts, Ltd., No. 1:94-CV-0157, 1995 WL 523619
(N.D. Ohio 1995) (not reported) (“[D]efendants sold counterfeit artworks bearing
forged artists’ signatures and false limited edition print numbers or artist proof desig-
nations—which items included fraudulent certificates of authentication signed by
defendant.”).
115. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6923
(“Artists creating limited editions in their types of works usually break their molds,
strike their plates, or otherwise destroy the materials from which additional original
copies of the work may be made. State fraud laws reinforce this practice by generally
prohibiting additions to a limited edition.”).
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covered an international network of forgers and dealers that flooded
the art market with fake prints.”116 The action began with a 1986 in-
vestigation that led to the 1991 seizure of over 75,000 counterfeit
works.117
Operation Bogart established the potential for federal authorities to
seize counterfeit works, to bring civil charges, and to prosecute crimi-
nal convictions for false attribution. Undoubtedly, the public is
harmed when it is sold works with fraudulent provenance. While cop-
yright will preempt those claims that assert an unauthorized party has
fraudulently copied the author’s work,118 it will not preempt claims of
state law fraud when false representations are used to induce the li-
cense agreement.119 This has proven to be the case for federal laws
enacted under authority outside the Copyright Clause as well.120
The actions by federal authorities establish a government interest in
protecting the public from false attribution of artwork and other false
markings that can affect the value of the artwork.121 The government
has an interest in assuring the public is informed as to the provenance
of the goods they are buying. Congress has power under the Com-
merce Clause to protect this interest, and federal agencies use this
power to stop art fraud and other deceptive trade practices.
116. FTC Wins $2.3 Million Judgment Against Gallery Owner In Phony Art Scam,
FTC PRESS RELEASE (Aug. 11, 1995), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/08/gabos3.shtm
(“Operation Bogart was a joint investigation by the Department of Justice, postal
inspectors, the FTC and European police working through Interpol.”).
117. Id.; see United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1996) (“In July 1991,
following an undercover investigation of the Amiels’ sales practices, the government
instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against several million dollars worth of the
Amiels’ real and personal property, alleging that the property was subject to forfei-
ture.”); see also U.S. v. Amiel, 995 F.2d 367, 371–72 (2d Cir. 1993) (providing addi-
tional historical information on the civil action and forfeitures).
118. See, e.g., Rutledge v. High Point Reg’l Health Sys., 558 F. Supp. 2d 611, 623
(M.D.N.C. 2008) (“‘[U]nauthorized’ consists of nothing more than reproduction, dis-
tribution and display of materials allegedly protected under the Copyright Act and
therefore cannot provide a separate element to avoid preemption.”).
119. E.g., Shuptrine v. McDougal Littell, 535 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897 (E.D. Tenn.
2008) (“Defendant entered into a relationship with Shuptrine allegedly under false
pretenses designed to lower the cost of obtaining Shuptrine’s paintings. Plaintiff’s
fraud allegation is a qualitatively different offense than merely exceeding the licensing
agreement.”).
120. United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 149 (2d. Cir. 2007) (“Congress ex-
ceeds its power under the Commerce Clause by transgressing limitations of the Copy-
right Clause only when (1) the law it enacts is an exercise of the power granted
Congress by the Copyright Clause and (2) the resulting law violates one or more
specific limits of the Copyright Clause.”); see also United States v. Moghadam, 175
F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999).
121. Falsifying the number of copies in a series of lithographs cannot affect the
copyright in the work but it can impact the value. A series with fewer copies will
generally have more value so falsifying the actual number of copies made can force
buyers to pay an unnecessary premium for the work. See TOM BAZLEY, CRIMES OF
THE ART WORLD 69 (2010).
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The FTC Endorsement Guidelines provide a much more specific
outline for the expectations of the public. When an opinion, endorse-
ment, picture, name or other form of endorsement is associated with
the quality of a work, that endorsement must be accurate. A person
making an endorsement without belief in the truth or accuracy of the
statement violates the FTC Endorsement Guidelines, so how much
greater is the violation made by a third party?122 And how much more
insidious if there is a financial incentive or reward for that third party
to make such false endorsements?123
V. WHY ATTRIBUTION MATTERS—THE VALUES OF
PUBLIC ATTRIBUTION
Unfair competition law places the power of enforcement in the
hands of the party harmed rather than relying on the FTC or the jus-
tice department to seek civil and criminal redress. When an artist’s
name or signature is used to authenticate a work, the public should be
able to rely on that name or signature. And the artist, along with fed-
eral and state authorities, should have power to enforce those rights.
The public is protected and copyright law is not harmed.
Plagiarism provides such a right. Where they exist, state plagiarism
laws afford yet another variation on protection against use of an au-
thor’s or artist’s content without attribution.124 “Plagiarism is the bor-
rowing of someone else’s work without attribution.”125 “Plagiarism
means intentionally taking the literary property of another without
attribution and passing it off as one’s own, having failed to add any-
thing of value to the copied material and having reaped from its use
an unearned benefit.”126 It may overlap with copyright, but the tort is
independent of copying of another’s protected expression and so is
distinct from copyright.127
For student work, plagiarism remains ubiquitous. “Too many stu-
dents are lifting ideas, passages—entire papers—and passing the work
122. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
401–02 (1890) (citations omitted).
123. See generally Richard Kielbowicz & Linda Lawson, Unmasking Hidden Com-
mercials in Broadcasting: Origins of the Sponsorship Identification Regulations,
1927–1963, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 329, 331–32 (2004) (discussing payola laws that pro-
hibit radio airplay for musical compositions without disclosure of the payments).
124. See Roger Billings, Plagiarism in Academia and Beyond: What Is the Role of
the Courts?, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 391, 392 (2004).
125. Id.
126. Laurie Stearns, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism, Process, Property, and the Law, 80
CAL. L. REV. 513, 516–17 (1992).
127. Billings, supra note 123, at 392–93 (“Engaging in plagiarism can result in both
copyright infringement under the Act and plagiarism, but plagiarism by itself remains
subject to state law.”).
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off as their own.”128 Though data is somewhat difficult to assess, in
“[w]eb surveys of over forty thousand undergraduates on sixty-eight
campuses in the United States and Canada, . . . 51 percent have ac-
knowledged at least one incident of serious cheating on written
work.”129 Earlier studies, conducted in 1963 and 1993, placed the inci-
dence at 65 percent and 66 percent respectively.130 The difference may
be a factor of how students self-report their behavior, their under-
standing of their behavior, or the impact of technology to identify pla-
giarism and other such conduct.131 Also unclear is the extent to which
plagiarism and cheating are becoming more common and less excep-
tional as student strategies.132
In the academic, literary and non-commercial circles, plagiarism
represents a form of palming off another’s work as one’s own, just as
replacing a label on a trademarked product is a form of reverse pass-
ing off under trademark law.133 Nonetheless, even plagiarism is im-
pacted by Dastar. At least one district court identified Dastar as an
attempted “plagiarism case” in which “the plaintiffs were attempting
to use trademark law to prosecute plagiarism of their creative
work.”134
Illinois refocused on plagiarism in higher education, making the
commercial sale of academic papers subject to civil proceedings and
injunctive relief.135 Codes of professional responsibility may include
128. Dian Schaffhauser, Fighting Plagiarism with Technology, CAMPUS TECH., Mar.
2013, at 12–13 (“It’s much easier for students to cheat than ever before, thanks in
large part to technology.”).
129. Donald L. McCabe, It Takes a Village: Academic Dishonesty and Educational
Opportunity, in ELEMENTS OF ARGUMENT: A TEXT AND READER 627 (Annette T.
Rottenberg & Donna Haisty Winchell eds., 2011).
130. Id. at 626.
131. See id. at 628; see also Schaffhauser, supra note 127, at 13.
132. See Kim Parker, Amanda Lenhart & Kathleen Moore, The Digital Revolution
and Higher Education College Presidents, Public Differ on Value of Online Learning,
PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, Aug. 28, 2011, at 6 (“Some 55% of college
presidents say plagiarism has increased in college students’ papers over the past 10
years . . . . Just 2% say it has decreased. Of those who say plagiarism is on the rise, the
overwhelming majority (89%) believe that computers and the internet have played a
major role . . . .”).
133. Stearns, supra note 125, at 517 (“In a sense, plagiarism (presenting another’s
work as one’s own) is the inverse of forgery (presenting one’s own work as
another’s).”).
134. Bach v. Forever Living Products U.S., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (W.D.
Wash. 2007).
135. 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 (2013).
Upon written petition by the chief executive officer of the campus of any
accredited institution of higher education in this State, the Attorney General
. . . is authorized to institute civil proceedings in the Circuit Court to enjoin
the sale, preparation for sale, advertising for sale, or offering for sale of any
academic papers. The court may grant the injunction upon finding that (1)
the preparer, advertiser or seller has purposely engaged in a course of con-
duct which he reasonably should have known would result in the submission
of such academic papers, substantially unchanged, as original work by any
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plagiarism within the conduct deemed unprofessional.136 As the Sixth
Circuit admonished the bar, “While our legal system stands upon the
building blocks of precedent, necessitating some amount of quotation
or paraphrasing, citation to authority is absolutely required when lan-
guage is borrowed.”137 In a recent decision involving publicity rights
and identity, the Eastern District of New York fined Lindsey Lohan’s
counsel for plagiarizing briefs and misrepresenting the efforts to cor-
rect the plagiarism.138
Plagiarism remains a rather amorphous tort, in part because of the
paucity of actual case law outside of academic circles. Nonetheless, it
represents the taking of another’s work and passing it off as one’s own
that rights of attribution should help address. Plagiarism laws do not
provide the alternative regulation needed, but the concepts may pro-
vide an outline for what Congress should adopt. Plagiarism provides
not the legal rules, but the normative values essential for the future.
It is certainly conceivable that student attitudes toward plagiarism
are informed by the law’s attitude towards attribution. If society does
not value the right of an artist or author to have her name associated
with her work in commercial settings, then why should students worry
about the provenance of the content they cut-and-paste from the In-
ternet into the assignment? The behaviors may not have changed, but
the consequences may have done so.
More importantly, as the nature of the workforce changes from in-
dustrial to informational,139 improvement in valuing attribution and
person other than the author in partial or total fulfillment of requirements
for academic credit at such accredited institution of higher education. . . . For
purposes of this Act, “academic papers” includes any theme, essay, term pa-
per, book report, thesis dissertation, or other academic paper.
Id.
136. See, e.g., Venesevich v. Leonard, No. 1:07-CV-211807CV2118, 2008 WL
5340162, at *2 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (“The court is both disappointed and disturbed to
conclude that plaintiff’s attorney, Don Bailey . . . has plagiarized a significant portion
of plaintiff’s brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss.”); see also In re Burghoff,
374 B.R. 681, 683 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2007) (lawyer copied an article posted online by
another law firm, copying “seventeen of the nineteen total pages in the pre-hearing
brief”); see also United States v. Bowen, 194 Fed. App’x 393, 402 (6th Cir. 2006)
(unpublished) (“In our own research in preparation for oral argument, we discovered
this section of Bowen’s brief, close to 20 pages, was copied almost verbatim from a
published district court decision, United States v. Malouf, 377 F. Supp. 2d 315 (D.
Mass. 2005) . . . .”); In re Lamberis, 443 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ill. 1982) (attorney censured
for plagiarism of masters degree thesis in law, which “constituted ‘conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation’ violating the Illinois Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4) (Illinois State Bar Association 1977).
137. Bowen, 194 Fed. App’x at 402.
138. Lohan v. Perez, 924 F. Supp. 2d 447, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Attorney Ovadia’s
misrepresentation . . . and submission of a plagiarized Opposition constituted an af-
front to the Court—not to defendants. The victim of the sanctionable misconduct is
the justice system itself . . . .”).
139. See John W. Moravec, Rethinking Human Capital Development in Knowmad
Society, in KNOWMAD SOCIETY 31, 36–39 (John W. Moravec ed., 2013) (“In the realm
of teaching and learning, this means that we are becoming not only co-learners, but
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fighting plagiarism will surely become a critical part of the successful
post-industrial culture. Attribution should not discourage collabora-
tion; instead, it should create value and reward for the contributions
made collaboratively.140 “The productivity of the worker will depend
on his ability to put to work concepts, ideas, theories—that is, things
learned in school—rather than skills acquired through experience.”141
If the concepts, ideas, theories, and knowledge have no provenance
and society has no respect for source or attribution, the information
environment will lag and corrupt. Respect for attribution may help to
create a positive trend for collaborative knowledge building in the in-
formation economy.142
VI. VARA—THE IMPERFECT SOLUTION
Given the tepid compliance with article 6bis of the Berne Conven-
tion, generally, the United States at least provides limited rights of
attribution to its artists, though not to other authors.143 The Visual
Artists Rights Act (VARA)144 provides limited protection to U.S. art-
ists regarding both the right of attribution and the right to integrity in
the artists’ work.145 VARA reflects a poor fit within U.S. copyright
law. It adds an additional exclusive right beyond those provided under
section 106 of the Copyright Act to claim authorship of a work of
visual art and “to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of
any work of visual art which he or she did not create . . . .”146 The right
of attribution is subject to the fair use limitation to copyright, but not
to the other limitations incorporated into sections 108 to 122 of the
Copyright Act.147
The statute highlights the interplay between rights of attribution
and rights of integrity by providing the author the right to disclaim a
work that has been distorted or mutilated. An artist “shall have the
right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work
also co-teachers as we co-constructively produce new knowledge and new applica-
tions for our knowledge.”); see also PETER DRUCKER, THE AGE OF DISCONTINUITY
37 (1969) (“Finally, these new industries differ from the traditional modern industry
in that they will employ predominantly knowledge workers rather than manual
workers.”).
140. In the realm of teaching and learning, this means that we are becoming not
only co-learners, but also co-teachers as we co-constructively produce new knowledge
and new applications for our knowledge.
141. DRUCKER, supra note 138.
142. Fisk, supra note 24, at 53–54 (“[C]redit becomes a form of human capital itself
because it translates and signals the existence of a deeper layer of human capital.”);
see also Jon M. Garon, Wiki Authorship, Social Media, and the Curatorial Audience, 1
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 95, 128 (2010).
143. Berne, supra note 99; see also Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fix-
ing the Dastar “Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659, 665 (2007).
144. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1990).
145. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2002).
146. Id.
147. See id.
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of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modifica-
tion of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation.”148
The addition of VARA to U.S. law was done in recognition of the
inadequate compliance U.S. law had with Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention, which requires minimum guarantees for rights of attribu-
tion and integrity.149 In entering the Berne Convention, U.S.
lawmakers relied more generally on the patchwork approach of unfair
competition and other laws to afford the needed protections for attri-
bution and integrity.150
The law was not without its controversy.151 “When the United
States joined Berne in 1988, the entertainment and publishing indus-
tries vehemently opposed the adoption of specified moral rights legis-
lation as part of the United States adherence to Berne.”152 To contain
the impact of VARA on the broader media industries, Congress nar-
rowly circumscribed the definition of a work of visual art.153
148. Id. The right of integrity is related to that of attribution but generally beyond
the scope of this Article.
149. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights in the
United States, in–INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: COPYRIGHT
AND RELATED RIGHTS, 95–96 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2006) [hereinafter Kwall].
150. William Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT
963, 965–76 (Arthur Fisher ed., 1963); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribu-
tion Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section
43(A), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 988 (2002).
151. See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of
Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557–58 (1940) (“Opposition has
been violent and one of the main objections is the inclusion of Article 6bis which, to a
limited extent, incorporates the moral right doctrine.”).
152. Kwall, supra note 148 at 96.
153. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
A “work of visual art” is—
(1) a painting, drawing, print or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively num-
bered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or
fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the
author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, ex-
isting in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of
200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author.
A work of visual art does not include—
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine,
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic
publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, cov-
ering, or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
Id.
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VARA protection for attribution exists only if a copyrighted work is
created that is limited to editions of 200 or fewer copies, provided
such copies are individually signed and numbered. VARA categori-
cally excludes advertising and promotional work, work for hire, as
well as electronic publications.154 VARA “has been critiqued as pro-
viding too little protection to too few artists.”155 In sum, VARA does
too little, does it poorly, and does it for too few.156
Because VARA covers such a small subset of works and authors, it
cannot serve as an adequate substitute for a true right of attribution.
Had VARA been U.S. law throughout the twentieth century, it would
not have helped William Clemens, Charlie Chaplin, Tess Gardella, Al-
berto Vargas, or Paul Smith protect their rights of attribution. Clem-
ens wrote for newspapers, Chaplin and Smith created for motion
pictures, Gardella performed on stage, and Vargas drew illustrations.
All these artists would find themselves outside of VARA protection.
VARA’s exclusion of electronic publications creates a second gap-
ing lapse in jurisprudential protection. In today’s networked, digital-
information ecology it may be increasingly common that copyrighted
works, and even works of fine art, exist predominantly in digital form.
The phrase “electronic publication” was not defined under the Copy-
right Act or in the legislative history of VARA.157 The phrase was not
used by the Supreme Court when distinguishing between electronic
databases and microfilm reproductions in New York Times Co., Inc. v.
Tasini.158 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office interprets the phrase
quite broadly to suggest an “electronic publication” includes an “on-
line database or Internet publication.”159
Presumably the use of a digital camera does not render a photo-
graph an electronic publication that would strip it of VARA protec-
154. Id.
155. Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. BUS. L.J.
407, 408 (2009) (citing Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copy-
right and Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 300 (2004)); Stuart Rebecca, A
Work of Heart: A Proposal for a Revision of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 to
Bring the United States Closer to International Standards, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
645 (2007).
156. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, at 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1037
(“hearings on the specific issue of moral rights and the Berne Convention . . . Peter
Nolan, for the Motion Picture Association of America, and Kenneth Dam, represent-
ing IBM, both of whom advocated adherence to Berne, but who testified that current
U.S. law on moral rights is sufficient for adherence”).
157. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6924.
158. N. Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 506 (2001) (“We conclude that the
Electronic Publishers infringed the Authors’ copyrights by reproducing and distribut-
ing the Articles in a manner not authorized by the Authors and not privileged by
§ 201(c).”).
159. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2128, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2128.html (last visited Mar. 14,
2014).
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tion.160 Though the legislative history suggests that negatives are
protected, as well as prints and transparencies, the requirement that
more than a single copy be signed and sequentially numbered makes
compliance unwieldy.161 The print derived from the digital camera be-
comes a VARA-protected photograph only when physically printed
for a non-illustrative use, signed and numbered.162 Moving images are
excluded as audiovisual works.163
The digitization of publishing and improvement in the quality of
digital displays likely mean that digital screens will increasingly be-
come one of the modern modes of artistic expression for the artist:164
We lived once in a world where the realm of the imaginary was
governed by the mirror, by dividing one into two, by otherness and
alienation. Today that realm is the realm of the screen, of interfaces
and duplication, of continuity and networks. All our machines are
screens and the interactivity of humans has been replaced by the
interactivity of screens.165
The arbitrary, antiquated rules of visual art in VARA serve as a
trap for the unwary and do little to protect the values at the heart of
attribution. In selecting among media, VARA does not further the
economic interests of artists or authors, galleries, publishers, produc-
ers, or retailers. Nor do the categories distinguish between works that
need authorial context and those for whom the author can be under-
stood as dead or irrelevant.166 The distinctions were technologically
regressive when promulgated and have devolved into a relic, irrele-
vant to all.
160. But see H.R. Rep. No. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6921(“The photographs encompassed by the definition are those still photographic
images produced for exhibition purposes. The bill covers both positives (for example,
prints, contact sheets, and transparencies such as slides) and negatives (negative pho-
tographic images or transparent material used for printing positives) of a
photograph.”).
161. See id.
162. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
163. Id.
164. See generally BRUCE WANDS, ART OF THE DIGITAL AGE (Reprinted ed.,
Thames & Hudson 2006); MELVIN L. ALEXENBERG, THE FUTURE OF ART IN A DIGI-
TAL AGE: FROM HELLENISTIC TO HEBRAIC CONSCIOUSNESS 33–34 (Intellect. Ltd.
2006) (“[C]oncept and context rather than visual appearance gives meaning to images
and objects was seriously discussed centuries ago by rabbis dealing with idolatry and
Greek aesthetics.”).
165. Ted Hiebert, Behind the Screen: Installations from the Interactive future, in
RANDY ADAMS, STEVE GIBSON, & STEFAN MÜLLER ARISONA, TRANSDISCIPLINARY
DIGITAL ART: SOUND, VISION AND THE NEW SCREEN 80 (2006/2007).
166. Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in TWENTIETH CENTURY LITERARY
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTORY ANTHOLOGY 124–42 (Vassilis Lambropoulos & David
Neal Miller eds. 1987); see also Brent Salter, Taming the Trojan Horse: An Australian
Perspective of Dramatic Authorship, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY. U.S.A. 789, 896 (2009);
Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1183
(2005) (“Michel Foucault suggested that authorship acted as an interpretive construct
primarily serving to limit the freedom of potential meanings in a text.”).
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As digital artwork becomes more significant and the potential for
fraudulent transactions in digital art becomes more common, the law
will need to move past VARA to provide express protection for these
works under copyright and under related doctrines to protect the pub-
lic and the artists from fraud and abuse. These works demand that a
new form of attribution be developed to identify the provenance of
the works as they change hands and as they are replicated—both law-
fully and unlawfully.
VII. ATTRIBUTION AS A FORM OF NATIONAL
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A somewhat closer fit to attribution rights can be found in various
state laws and common law principles protecting the rights of public-
ity. “Today it is possible to state with clarity that the right of publicity
is simply this: it is the inherent right of every human being to control
the commercial use of his or her identity.”167 Thirty-one states recog-
nize some form of the right of publicity, while the two states that re-
jected common law protection enacted statutes to provide the right.168
For example, New York rejected a common law right of publicity in
1902169 but quickly enacted statutory protection.170 As those provi-
sions exist today, sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Act
prohibits the use of a person’s “name, portrait, picture or voice . . . for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written
consent.”171
The New York statute makes very specific references to advertising
and trade as conditions necessary to provide protection under the stat-
ute.172 This does not necessarily end all analysis. While the Second
Circuit suggests that a T-shirt sold in a magazine would properly be
treated as “for purposes of trade,” placing a folded poster in such a
magazine would depend on many factors.173
167. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed.,
2013).
168. Id. § 6:3.
169. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902) (“Such
publicity, which some find agreeable, is to plaintiff very distasteful, and thus . . . she
seeks the aid of the courts to enjoin a further circulation of the lithographic prints
containing her portrait . . . .”).
170. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2012) (enacted 1903).
171. See id.; see also Lohan v. Perez, 924 F. Supp. 2d 447, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(dismissing publicity rights claim for use of actress’s name in song lyrics).
172. Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 1989) (“In
order to establish a violation of section 51, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
made use, within the state of New York, of plaintiff’s name, portrait, or picture ‘for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade’ without plaintiff’s written
consent.”).
173. Id. at 89.
In determining whether [a poster inserted into a magazine] has been a use
for the purposes of trade, the fact-finder should consider a variety of factors
including, but not limited to the nature of the item, the extent of its relation-
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Unlike New York, California utilizes both a statutory formulation
and a common law formulation, which are somewhat representative.
“A common law cause of action for appropriation of name or likeness
may be pleaded by alleging (1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s
identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defen-
dant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and
(4) resulting injury.”174
The statutory construction is similar in many regards. California
Civil Code § 3344(a) provides, in relevant part:
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchan-
dise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting
purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without
such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sus-
tained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.175
Absent limitations, the right of publicity would create a powerful
property right inconsistent with free-speech principles.176 To alleviate
this tension, both common law and legislative accommodations
abound.177 In addition to a number of First Amendment limitations on
the right of publicity, the statutory right includes a significant statu-
tory limitation, exempting from publicity rights uses “in connection
with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any
political campaign.”178 These limitations attempt to keep rights of
publicity focused on commercial exploitation of a person’s identity so
that there is a fairly bright line between protection of publicity rights
involving commercial exploitation of an individual and free speech
rights to identify an individual in photographs, by name, or in other
ship to the traditional content of a magazine, the ease with which it may be
detached from the magazine, whether it is suitable for use as a separate
product once detached, and how the publisher markets the item.
Id.
174. Eastwood v. Super. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Dist. Ct. App. 1983); see also
Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 889 (9th Cir. 2009) (same test); Downing v.
Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2001) (same test); Kirby v. Sega of
Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 612 (Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“The elements of a com-
mon law action are the unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s identity to the defendant’s
advantage by appropriating the plaintiff’s name, voice, likeness, etc., commercially or
otherwise, and resulting injury.”).
175. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2013).
176. See Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 615 (“[A] tension frequently exists between the
First Amendment’s goal of fostering a marketplace of ideas and respect for individual
expression, and a celebrity’s right of publicity.”).
177. Downing, 265 F.3d at 1001 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Under both the common law
cause of action and the statutory cause of action ‘no cause of action will lie for the
publication of matters in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public to
know and the freedom of the press to tell it.’”) (quoting Montana v. San Jose Mercury
News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790, 793 (1995)).
178. See id. § 3344(b).
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ways outside of direct commercial exploitation.179 Unfortunately, that
is not necessarily how the courts have interpreted the laws.180
Though not universally adopted, Rogers v. Grimaldi181 provides the
best balancing of free speech and commercial rights protections.182 In
Rogers, the Second Circuit recognized “[p]oetic license is not without
limits. The purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can of peas,
has a right not to be misled as to the source of the product.”183 Recog-
nizing the tension between artistic or communicative works and com-
mercial fraud on the public, the court emphasized the need for
balance. “We believe that in general the Act should be construed to
apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding con-
sumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.”184
As such, the use of a celebrity’s name will not be actionable “unless
the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever,
or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads
as to the source or the content of the work.”185 This balance assures
that the right of attribution remains an interest for the author and
artist but not a gag limiting future works.186
Despite the usefulness of the Rogers Test, the California Supreme
Court focused instead on the second work by emphasizing the extent
to which the use is transformative. In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc.187 and Winter v. DC Comics,188 the California Su-
179. See generally Michael D. Murray, Reconstructing the Contours of the Copyright
Originality and Idea-Expression Doctrines Regarding the Right to Deny Access to
Works, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 921, 927 (2014) (discussing the right to access as a copy-
right interest that militates against over-enforcement. This approach applies with
equal vigor to publicity rights in communicative works.)
180. See Jon M. Garon, Beyond the First Amendment: Shaping the Contours of
Commercial Speech in Video Games, Virtual Worlds, and Social Media, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 607, 651 (2012) (calling for a more narrowly constructed right of publicity in-
volving commercial activities).
181. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
182. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d
1268, 1279 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Rogers v. Grimaldi is a landmark Second Circuit case
balancing First Amendment rights against claims under the Lanham Act.”).
183. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.
184. Id. at 999.
185. Id. (“A misleading title with no artistic relevance cannot be sufficiently justi-
fied by a free expression interest.”).
186. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 448 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); Westchester Media v.
PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664–65 (5th Cir. 2000); Seale v. Gramercy
Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 339 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Com-
petition, § 47, cmt. (c) (“[T]he use of a person’s identity primarily for the purpose of
communicating information or expressing ideas is not generally actionable as a viola-
tion of the person’s right of publicity,” unless the name or likeness is used solely to
attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified person, or if the work
contains substantial falsifications.).
187. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
188. See generally Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003) (applying the
Comedy III Transformative Test).
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preme Court applied a transformative test, reinterpreting California’s
rights of publicity laws to provide additional guidance on the protec-
tions afforded to speech rights and those provided to individuals who
find their identity commercialized without permission.
In Comedy III, the Court determined that the unauthorized repro-
duction of the images of The Three Stooges on T-shirts did not consti-
tute a commercial use because “T-shirts at issue in [the] case did not
constitute an advertisement, endorsement, or sponsorship of any
product.”189 If T-shirts are considered by the California Supreme
Court to be an expressive medium, then canvases, prints, sculptures,
and other more expressive media will also fall outside the commercial
category.190
The challenge in California is the additional question of whether an
otherwise noncommercial use remains actionable because the use is
not transformative. The California Supreme Court has added this
question to the analysis, presumably to give more breathing space for
the First Amendment.191
Unlike the Transformative Test used by California, the Rogers Test
provides a useful standard to recognize the right of attribution in the
title of a work or when used in association with a work while at the
same time limiting the nature of that right to provide significant
breathing space for the First Amendment right of future artists and
authors. Creators of documentaries, biographies, news reports, and
new artistic works do not need the permission of their subjects to in-
corporate their subjects into new works.
Whereas the Transformative Test engages the court in an aesthetic
judgment over the communicative value of the new work,192 the Rog-
ers Test focuses on the commercial nature of the transaction and the
189. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 801.
190. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003)
(image of Tiger Woods used in lithographs not a violation of Wood’s publicity rights
because of the transformative nature of the work).
191. Winter, 69 P.3d at 477 (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 797).
We developed a test to determine whether a work merely appropriates a
celebrity’s economic value, and thus is not entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection, or has been transformed into a creative product that the First
Amendment protects. The “inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of
the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or whether
the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of
the work in question. We ask, in other words, whether a product containing a
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defen-
dant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness. And when we use
the word ‘expression,’ we mean expression of something other than the like-
ness of the celebrity.”
Id.
192. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808 (showing how the court distinguishes between
“good substitutes for conventional depictions” or “when a work contains significant
transformative elements” that make such uses “especially worthy of First Amendment
protection . . . .”).
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likelihood of confusion involved when selling communicative
works.193 It accepts that the public should be able to assume the use of
attribution on a product or advertisement is an endorsement fully
compliant with FTC Endorsement Guidelines for commercial prod-
ucts. It also respects the public, finding us sufficiently sophisticated to
understand when a celebrity’s name is used to evoke something other
than an endorsement by that celebrity. The Rogers Test combined
with regulations that require public disclosure of hidden endorse-
ments194 create a framework for appropriate attribution rights and
limitations.
The Ninth Circuit, interpreting these tests under California law,
highlights their different purposes. “The right of publicity protects the
celebrity, not the consumer.”195 But this assumes that the celebrity
will not tomorrow be the artist hauled before a judge for violating the
publicity rights of yet another celebrity. Like copyright and the First
Amendment, these laws favoring individuals are designed to benefit
the public as a whole.196 Creating breathing space for rights of attribu-
tion does, in fact, protect celebrities; just as fair use protects artists
from undue constraints as to the source of materials.197
VIII. THE WAY FORWARD
Adopting statutory solutions to the lack of attribution would do
much to signal the public importance of attribution and hopefully a
renewed public interest in decreasing plagiarism.198 Ultimately this
may be the most important aspect of the expansion of attribution
rights. Digital content puts copies of works onto our devices and into
the hands of the public in ever-changing ways.199 By creating renewed
protection for rights of attribution, Congress would emphasize the re-
193. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997–99 (2d Cir. 1989).
194. See text accompanying supra note 7.
195. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d
1268, 1281 (9th Cir. 2013).
196. See Murray, supra note 178, at __ (“Neither system—copyright or First
Amendment—is a reward system, not a quid pro quo system, not directly tied to
benefitting speakers, authors, artists, and inventors. Instead, we have one system that
indirectly benefits speakers, authors, artists, and inventors as it directly benefits the
public.”).
197. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808–09 (discussing goals of First Amendment and
Fair Use).
198. See generally A.V. v. iParadigms, Ltd. Liab. Co., 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 478
(E.D. Va. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v.
iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009) (“According to school administrators,
plagiarism had become a major problem in each school district and Turnitin was em-
ployed in an effort to decrease plagiarism in their schools.”); David E. Sorkin, Practic-
ing Plagiarism, 81 ILL. B.J. 487, 487 (1993) (“In journalism, literature, and science,
plagiarism is among the greatest sins. In college and law school, it can be a basis for
severe disciplinary sanctions, including suspension or expulsion.”).
199. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG
TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (Stanford Univ. Press, rev. ed., 2003); see also LAW-
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spect due to the creators of the source material into which new works
are developed.200 By treating attribution as more than an international
duty or benefit for select artists, Congress would emphasize that the
fidelity and provenance of content matters. But by limiting the rights
to the solutions suggested in this Article, Congress would avoid creat-
ing additional significant barriers to the growing collaborative culture.
Precisely for this reason, it is attribution that becomes the predomi-
nant moral right to be developed for the digital age.
Although the FTC Endorsement Guidelines recognize the market
impact of attribution, they do not create a private cause of action.
Combined with the limitations on Lanham Act protections caused by
Dastar, new legislation is necessary to return to compliance with arti-
cle 6bis of the Berne Convention for attribution rights, and ideally to
vest those rights as federal law rather than as a patchwork of state law.
One possibility is to expand the scope of Section 106A to eliminate
the focus on works of visual arts and instead apply the provision
across all works protected by copyright. To balance the issues involved
in works for hire, this approach should include the ability of the par-
ties to make agreements to waive the rights permissible. While it may
be preferable that every contributor to a software project or a public
wiki is listed in the credits, the transaction costs may make these attri-
bution rights more of a burden than benefit. Participants in shared
creative enterprises should certainly have the ability to waive their
right to attribution just as surely as they have a presumptive right to
that attribution.201
The solution to extend attribution across all copyrighted works
would protect Alberto Vargas and many of the artists such as de-
scribed in this Article, but it would not provide protection for per-
formers such as Charlie Chaplin who worked under work for hire
agreements or Tess Gardella who claimed protections as a performer
rather than as an author. Expanding Section 106A across all works
may provide only a partial solution.
A second approach would focus more directly on Dastar itself. The
unfair competition analysis of Rogers is a trademark analysis that au-
thors now have to distinguish in order to protect their legitimate
RENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) (renamed CODE
1.0).
200. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 391–92 (1997) (presenting the theory of esteem-based
norms, describing the conditions necessary for their development, and concluding that
“an important function of law is to shape or regulate norms”). C.f. Sara Sun Beale,
Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal
Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1255–58 (2000) (discussing literature that sug-
gests the public is not sufficiently aware of laws to have any such effect).
201. See Garon,, supra note 141, at 111–12 (“Control over attribution plays a num-
ber of roles.”).
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trademarks.202 The Supreme Court was wrong to suggest that a cause
of action for plagiarism cannot be reached by section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act for works still under copyright and for performances never
protected by copyright.203 Where the services embodied in a commu-
nicative work designate the source of that performance or copyright,
such services should be properly attributed unless the service provider
has agreed to the contrary.
The codification of such a rule could be placed in either the Copy-
right Act or the Lanham Act, though incorporation into the Copyright
Act would be preferable. The Supreme Court was correct in the out-
come of Dastar and its position that a copyrighted work no longer
protected by copyright should be free for most uses.
Even here, however, the intersection of copyright and trademark
law must be more reflective of the distinct purpose of both laws. For
example, in Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enterprises,204 the Seventh Circuit
did not address Nike’s trademark claim against a parodist because the
trademarked Nike swoosh is a geometric shape not protectable by
copyright, nor did it focus on the short phrase “just do it” would not
be subject to copyright protection.205 Similarly, a company can adopt
an image once under copyright but now in the public domain as its
trademark, and provided the mark is inherently distinctive or other-
wise acquires secondary meaning,206 that mark can be a valid trade-
202. See Bach v. Forever Living Prods. U.S., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116–18
(W.D. Wash. 2007).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot bring their trademark claims be-
cause copyright law provides an adequate remedy.
. . .
Plaintiffs are seeking remedies for distinct wrongs under each legal frame-
work. Plaintiffs’ rights in the name and title of Jonathan Livingston Seagull
and the trade dress of the book cover (a white seagull in silhouette against a
blue background) are protected under trademark law, not copyright law, be-
cause it is the name, title, and trade dress that are the source-identifying
marks associated with Plaintiffs. And Plaintiffs’ rights in the JLS character,
the photograph that FLP used as its logo, and the portions of the copy-
righted text used by FLP, are protected under copyright law, not trademark
law, because the character, text, and images in Jonathan Livingston Seagull
are the artists’ creative work.
Id. 1116–18 (emphasis omitted).
203. C.f., id. at 1116 (“The Supreme Court held that the ‘origin of goods’ provision
in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not contain a cause of action for
plagiarism.”).
204. Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enterprs., 6 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1993).
205. Id. at 1226–27 n.2 (“JUST DO IT is not a registered trademark. The district
court found that because of its inherently distinctive attributes as applied to NIKE
goods, it was entitled to trademark protection under the common law.”).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2012); see Time, Inc. v. Petersen Publ’g Co., 173 F.3d 113,
117 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A mark is entitled to protection when it is inherently distinctive;
if the mark is ‘merely descriptive,’ it qualifies for protection only if it has acquired
secondary meaning . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).
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mark for those particular classes of goods or services.207 A particular
illustration of Shakespeare or Poe can serve as a trademark for a
bookstore using that surname as part of its title without removing the
illustration from the public domain.208 So Dastar should be properly
understood to mean that while a party can never create the likelihood
of confusion without violating the Lanham Act, the absence of attri-
bution cannot create such likelihood of confusion in a work that has
fallen into the public domain.
This rule can be summarized with two provisions. First, the Copy-
right Act does not pre-empt the statutory authority in the Lanham
Act and applicable state trademark and unfair competition laws. Sec-
ond, all rights of an author to claim attribution of a work shall be
terminated upon the end of copyright protection of such work. Taken
together, these two rules will undo the damage caused by Dastar and
return U.S. law to an improved mosaic of attribution rights.
There is an additional benefit to structuring the solution in this
manner. Positioning the right of attribution as an additional right
under Section 106 would enable a plaintiff to protect that right using
the applicable statutory damages provisions afforded to other exclu-
sive rights.209 Copyright acts as a strict liability tort for which the stat-
utory remedy can be reduced, but not below $200.00.210 By placing the
source of rights for attribution outside of the exclusive rights granted
to copyright owners in trademark law, the potential for a windfall of
statutory damages can be eliminated.
Trademark law does not have a statutory minimum damage
award.211 “Additionally, the court has discretion to shape relief ‘ac-
cording to the principles of equity and the individual circumstances of
207. See Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The fact that a copyrightable character or design has fallen into the
public domain should not preclude protection under the trademark laws so long as it
is shown to have acquired independent trademark significance, identifying in some
way the source or sponsorship of the goods.”).
208. This Article does not explore the appropriate term for rights of publicity
rights. At a minimum such rights must not expire for a person when living but the
length beyond death is beyond the scope of this Article. As illustrated with the exam-
ples of Shakespeare and Poe, these rights should not last in perpetuity. For works
under copyright, the attribution should be con-terminus with the copyright so that
neither right has the effect of extending or limiting the other right.
209. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012) (“the copyright owner may elect, at any time
before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits,
an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action . . . .”).
210. Id.; see Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (“If
the infringer proves that his infringement was innocent, the court may reduce dam-
ages to an amount not less than $200.”).
211. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (West 2009) (Upon a finding of “a violation under section
1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title, . . .
the plaintiff shall be entitled, . . . to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages
sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.”).
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each case.’”212 The nature of trademark law remedies may provide a
better body of law upon which to develop injunctive relief and eco-
nomic damages.
The third approach would build upon the second approach and add
a new federal law modeled after the California Right of Publicity stat-
ute for use of name, likeness, or image in interstate commerce involv-
ing a commercial transaction, creating a single federal standard
protecting the rights of publicity across the U.S. Congressional hear-
ings could clarify whether the Transformative Test, the Rogers Test, or
some other fair use accommodation for First Amendment concerns.
The enactment should again make clear that the rights to attribution
were not preempted by copyright except as to those works that were
protected by copyright and which had their copyright term expire.
An even broader approach that would amend the Lanham Act to
provide an additional, federal right of attribution for the source of
services embodied in any good or service sold in interstate commerce
in the United States would go too far. This approach would not be
limited to protection from mis-identification but would instead create
the right to credit for every worker involved in the manufacture of
every product sold. While such a fundamental change in the rights of
the United States or global workforce could have interesting social
implications, the effect is far beyond the importance of attribution for
artists that the recommendations of this Article attempt to address.
Together, these two provisions provide the necessary and sufficient
solution to enhance artists, address the expansion of works into digital
media, promote a culture of attribution, and maintain a positive, crea-
tive, collaborative culture. More can be done, as suggested above, but
this minimum will serve society well.
IX. CONCLUSION
The overreaching in Dastar and the limitations in the definition of
visual artwork enacted as part of VARA combine to create an unfor-
tunate gap in the legal and moral protection of digital artists as well as
artists, authors, and performers more generally. The law has long rec-
ognized that the work of artists, like Charlie Chaplin, deserve legal
protection both for the sake of the artist and for the public they serve.
Eliminating the unnecessary preemption of copyright in certain
trademark disputes will help. So will recognizing the public benefit,
which accrues when the public knows the source of performances and
content in the goods and services they acquire. Taken together, these
steps will foster the values of attribution the law has long recognized,
encourage an economy that takes plagiarism seriously as a moral fail-
212. Ptak Bros. Jewelry, Inc. v. Ptak, No. 06 Civ. 13732(DC), 2009 WL 1514469, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger
U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 71–72 (2d Cir.1998)).
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ure, and promote incentives to create, which have no economic cost
but much social benefit.
In areas such as advertising and endorsements, federal regulations
highlight the importance of attribution. In a myriad of state publicity
laws, states and courts recognize the economic and social importance
of attribution. As the existing copyright laws on attribution become
outdated though the growth of digital technology, it is time to revisit
the issue and provide a reasonable solution that benefits all of society
while doing harm to none. The United States should finally meet its
obligation to afford the right of attribution to its authors and creators.
